

Deriving Process-Related RBAC Models from Process Execution Histories

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Abstract—In a business process context, access permissions grant the rights to perform certain tasks. In particular, process-related role-based access control (RBAC) models define RBAC policies for process-aware information systems (PAIS). In addition, process-related RBAC models allow for the definition of entailment constraints on tasks, such as mutual exclusion or binding constraints, for example. This paper presents an approach to derive process-related RBAC models from process execution histories recorded by a PAIS. In particular, we present algorithms to derive corresponding RBAC artifacts and entailment constraints from standardized XML-based log files. All algorithms presented in this paper have been implemented and were tested via process logs created with CPN Tools.

Keywords—PAIS; RBAC; Constraints; Process Execution History

I. INTRODUCTION

Process-aware information systems (PAIS) support the execution of tasks that are included in a business process [1]. The history of process executions in a PAIS can be recorded in special purpose log files often referred to as “event log”, “audit trail”, “history”, or “transaction log”. In the remainder of this paper, we refer to such a file as the *process execution history*.

In recent years, role-based access control (RBAC) has developed into a de facto standard for access control (see, e.g., [2]–[4]). In RBAC, permissions are assigned to roles, and roles are assigned to subjects (e.g. human users). A process-related RBAC model (see, e.g., [5]–[8]) supports the definition of access control policies and entailment constraints on tasks. Entailment constraints, such as mutual exclusion and binding constraints, define which combination of subjects and roles is allowed to execute particular tasks (see, e.g., [5], [6], [9]–[11]). Mutual exclusion (ME) constraints result from the division of powerful privileges to avoid fraud and abuse. Thus, two (or more) mutually exclusive tasks must *not* be executed by the same subject or role. In contrast, binding constraints specify that the same subject or role has to perform two bound tasks.

From our experiences, gained in real-world projects and case studies, business processes as well as corresponding permissions or entailment constraints are often insufficiently documented – sometimes they are not documented at all. In this case, organizational mining can be applied to derive information about the subjects executing tasks in a PAIS (see, e.g., [12]–[14]). In this paper, we complement corresponding

organizational mining approaches and present algorithms to derive process-related RBAC models from process execution histories (log files) of a PAIS. In particular, we derive *current-state RBAC models* that document the current state of this PAIS. These RBAC models contain roles, subjects, tasks/permissions, assignment relations, as well as binding and mutual exclusion constraints defined on tasks (see also [15]).

A. Approach Overview

Figure 1 gives an overview of the steps we perform to derive current-state RBAC models.




Figure 1. Deriving current-state RBAC models: Overview

In this paper, we focus on deriving candidate RBAC artifacts and assignment relations, as well as candidate mutual exclusion and binding constraints defined on tasks (see Figure 1). The artifacts and artifact relations that are derived from a process execution history are *candidates* because they are subject to a subsequent refinement performed by a domain expert. One of the reasons for such a refinement is that the process execution history records all executions in a PAIS regardless of organizational changes (such as changes of the user’s work profiles). For a tailored RBAC model, artifacts and artifact relations can be modified, added, or removed. For example, a new task could be added if this

task is rarely executed and is therefore not recorded in a certain process execution history.

In particular, we extend the approach from [16] to derive candidate RBAC artifacts and assignment relations from a process execution history (see Section III-A). Moreover, we present algorithms to parse the process execution history of a PAIS to derive candidates for mutual exclusion and binding constraints (see Sections III-B – III-E). The candidate artifacts, assignment relations, and constraints will be combined to produce the current-state RBAC model (see Figure 1). Subsequently, all candidates can be fed into a corresponding software tool to further manipulate/refine the respective RBAC artifacts and associations and to build a tailored RBAC model (see, e.g., [17], [18]).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the definitions for process-related RBAC models and process execution histories. In Section III, we present the derivation of current-state RBAC models in detail. It includes the derivation of RBAC artifacts and their assignment relations, as well as algorithms to derive mutual exclusion and binding constraints. Section IV discusses related work and Section V concludes the paper.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Role-Based Access Control Models

For the purposes of this paper, Definition 1 repeats some of the definitions for process-related RBAC models (for details see [5]).

Definition 1 (Process-related RBAC Model). *Let S be a set of subjects, R a set of roles, P_T a set of process types, P_I a set of process instances, T_T a set of task types, and T_I a set of task instances. A process-related RBAC Model $PRM = (E, Q, D)$ where $E = S \cup R \cup P_T \cup P_I \cup T_T \cup T_I$ refers to pairwise disjoint sets of the model, $Q = rsa \cup tra \cup pi \cup ti \cup es \cup er$ to mappings that establish relationships, and $D = sme \cup dme \cup sb \cup rb$ to mutual exclusion and binding constraints. For the partial mappings of the meta-model (\mathcal{P} refers to the power set):*

- 1) *The mapping $rsa : S \mapsto \mathcal{P}(R)$ is called role-to-subject assignment. For $rsa(s) = R_s$ we call $s \in S$ subject and $R_s \subseteq R$ the set of roles assigned to this subject (the set of roles owned by s).*
- 2) *The mapping $tra : R \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_T)$ is called task-to-role assignment. For $tra(r) = T_r$ we call $r \in R$ role and $T_r \subseteq T_T$ is called the set of tasks assigned to r .*
- 3) *The mapping $pi : P_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(P_I)$ is called process instantiation. For $pi(p_T) = P_i$ we call $p_T \in P_T$ process type and $P_i \subseteq P_I$ the set of process instances instantiated from process type p_T .*
- 4) *The mapping $ti : (T_T \times P_I) \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_I)$ is called task instantiation. For $ti(t_T, p_I) = T_i$ we call $T_i \subseteq T_I$ set of task instances, $t_T \in T_T$ is called task type and $p_I \in P_I$ is called process instance.*

- 5) *The mapping $es : T_I \mapsto S$ is called executing-subject mapping. For $es(t) = s$ we call $s \in S$ the executing-subject and $t \in T_I$ is called executed task instance.*
- 6) *The mapping $er : T_I \mapsto R$ is called executing-role mapping. For $er(t) = r$ we call $r \in R$ the executing-role and $t \in T_I$ is called executed task instance.*
- 7) *The mapping $sme : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_T)$ is called static mutual exclusion. For $sme(t_1) = T_{sme}$ with $T_{sme} \subseteq T_T$ we call each pair $t_1 \in T_T$ and $t_x \in T_{sme}$ statically mutual exclusive tasks.*
- 8) *The mapping $dme : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_T)$ is called dynamic mutual exclusion. For $dme(t_1) = T_{dme}$ with $T_{dme} \subseteq T_T$ we call each pair $t_1 \in T_T$ and $t_x \in T_{dme}$ dynamically mutual exclusive tasks.*
- 9) *The mapping $sb : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_T)$ is called subject-binding. For $sb(t_1) = T_{sb}$ we call $t_1 \in T_T$ the subject binding task and $T_{sb} \subseteq T_T$ the set of subject-bound tasks.*
- 10) *The mapping $rb : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_T)$ is called role-binding. For $rb(t_1) = T_{rb}$ we call $t_1 \in T_T$ the role binding task and $T_{rb} \subseteq T_T$ the set of role-bound tasks.*




Figure 2. Example of a process-related RBAC model

Figure 2 depicts an RBAC model example. It shows two subjects ($s1, s2$), two roles ($r1, r2$), as well as three tasks ($t1, t2, t3$) which include mutual exclusion and binding constraints (see, e.g., [5], [7]–[9], [11], [19]). Tasks can be defined as statically mutual exclusive (on the process type level) or dynamically mutual exclusive (on the process instance level). A static mutual exclusion (SME) constraint defines that two SME tasks must never be assigned to the same role. In contrast, two dynamically mutual exclusive (DME) tasks can be assigned to the same role, but must be performed by two different subjects within the same process instance. For example, in Figure 2 subjects owning the role $r2$ are allowed to perform the two DME tasks $t2$ (e.g. to order supplies) and $t3$ (e.g. to approve an order). However, in the same process instance (e.g. for one particular order) the subject performing task $t2$ must be different from the subject performing $t3$.

Bound tasks can be subdivided into subject-bound and role-bound tasks. A subject-binding (SB) constraint defines

that two bound tasks must be performed by the same subject. In turn, a role-binding (RB) constraint defines that bound tasks must be performed by members of the same role, but not necessarily by the same subject. The example in Figure 2 shows a subject-binding constraint defined on the tasks $t1$ (e.g. to collect inventory data) and $t2$ (e.g. to order supplies). Here, the SB constraint defines that the subject collecting the inventory data ($t1$) also has to order the needed supplies ($t2$).

B. Process Execution History

The process execution history contains information about the tasks performed in a PAIS. We refer to an entry in the process execution history as *process history entry* (see Figure 3). Each entry includes a task instance and the subject executing the task instance. Definition 2 resembles the definition from [13] and specifies the essential elements of a process execution history.

Definition 2 (Process Execution History). *Let T_I be a set of task instances, P_I a set of process instances, and S a set of subjects performing task instances (see Definition 1). An element of $E = T_I \times S$ is called process history entry. E denotes the set of process history entries and $p_i \in P_I$ denotes a process instance for which E_{P_I} is the set of possible sequences of entries describing the particular process instance p_i .*

A process execution history $P_H \in \mathcal{B}(p_i)$ is a multi-set of all possible process instances, such that:

- 1) For $e_x = (t_i, s_j)$, the subject $s_j \in S$ performed the task instance t_i in process history entry $e_x \in E$. This definition corresponds to the executing-subject mapping $es(t_i) = s_j$ of Definition 1.5 where s_j is the executing-subject of task instance t_i .
- 2) For $p_i = (e_0, e_1, \dots, e_k)$, $p_i \in P_H$ is called process instance and $e_0, \dots, e_k \in E$ are the process history entries belonging to the process instance $p_i \in P_I$. In correspondence to Definition 1.4, the task instance in a process history entry is the instantiation of a specific task type.

Figure 3 shows an example of a *process execution history*. A process execution history contains several process instances. Each process instance consists of several process history entries which describe the sequence of task instances executed in the corresponding process instance. Figure 3 also shows the *task execution history* (T_H) which records all task instances, process instances, and the corresponding executing-subjects for a specific task type. Definition 3 specifies task execution histories (cf. [13]).

Definition 3 (Task Execution History). *Let T_T be a set of task types, T_I a set of task instances, S a set of subjects, and P_I a set of process instances (see also Definition 1). The task execution history $T_H \in (T_I \times S \times P_I)$ refers to a record of the set of task instances T_I , the set of executing-subjects S , and the set of process instances P_I such that:*




Figure 3. Example of a process execution history

- 1) The task execution history of a particular task type is defined as mapping $th : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(\{(t_x, s_x, p_x) | t_x \in T_I, s_x \in S, p_x \in P_I\})$. The task execution history of a task type returns a record of triples, each consisting of a task instance, a subject, and a process instance. For each task type $t \in T_T$, the task execution history is defined as $th(t) = \{(t_x, s_x, p_x) | p_x \in P_I, t_x \in T_I, s_x \in S : t_x \in ti(t, p_x) \wedge es(t_x) = s_x\}$.
- 2) The task execution history implies a mapping subject group $th_S : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(S)$ that returns all executing-subjects of a task type. The mapping executed task instances $th_I : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(T_I)$ returns all task instances of a task type. Likewise, the mapping executed process instances $th_P : T_T \mapsto \mathcal{P}(P_I)$ returns all process instances in which a instance of the task type was executed.

The task execution history can be derived from the process execution history. Figure 3 shows the task execution history of task type “A”. From this history the subject group of “A” is a set containing “Alice” and “Claire” who performed (at least) one task instance of task type “A”. This means, the subject group mapping th_S shows the executing-subjects of one task type.

III. DERIVING PROCESS-RELATED RBAC MODELS

We discuss our approach using a process execution history created with CPN Tools (see [20]). For demonstration purposes, we use a simplified example of a credit application process (see Figure 4) for which we generated corresponding XML-based log files. MXML (Mining XML) [21] and XES (Extensible Event Stream) [22] are two common standard formats for process execution histories in XML syntax. We use the CPN Tools to produce log files in these formats and to determine the structure and content of the process execution history. Furthermore, using the simulation capabilities of CPN Tools allows us to integrate all kinds of candidates for artifacts, assignment relations, and constraints in a controlled

SME constraint between two tasks of the same process type if no subject exists who executes both tasks (see also Definition 1.7 and [5]). This means, a candidate SME constraint defined on two tasks $task_x, task_y \in T_T$ for a process type $p_t \in P_T$ is derived if $allExecutingSubjects(task_x, p_t) \cap allExecutingSubjects(task_y, p_t) = \emptyset$ applies. Thus, Algorithm 1 checks if the executing-subjects of two task types for a given process type are disjoint and then defines a candidate SME constraint on the given task types.

Algorithm 1 Derive candidate SME constraints

Input: $T_T, p_t \in P_T$
1: **for each** $task_x \in T_T$ **do**
2: **for each** $task_y \in T_T \mid task_y \neq task_x$ **do**
3: **if** $allExecutingSubjects(task_x, p_t) \cap$
4: $allExecutingSubjects(task_y, p_t) = \emptyset$ **then**
5: **set** $task_x \in sme(task_y)$ ▷ marked as candidate
6: **end if**
7: **end for**
8: **end for**

Figure 6 shows a process execution history excerpt in MXML standard format². It shows two example process instances (ProcessInstance), each containing two process execution entries (AuditTrailEntry). An entry is composed of a task instance (WorkflowModelElement) and an executing-subject (Originator). In Figure 6, the two task instances “Check credit worthiness” and “Approve contract” are executed by different subjects (shown via arrow 1). In this excerpt, “Alice” and “Susan” perform the first task ($th_S(\text{Check for credit worthiness}) = \{Alice, Susan\}$) and “Bob” performs the second task ($th_S(\text{Approve contract}) = \{Bob\}$) (shown via arrow 2). Using the process execution history shown in Figure 6, we can derive a candidate SME constraint defined on these two tasks because these tasks are not performed by the same subject.




Figure 6. Example detection of SME tasks

C. Deriving Candidate DME Constraints

We derive candidate DME constraints if two tasks are never executed by the same subject in the *same* process instance. In contrast to SME constraints, DME tasks can be executed by the same subjects within *different* process instances (see also Definition 1.8 and [5]). In other words, a subject is allowed to execute two DME tasks but not in the same process instance. Therefore, a candidate DME constraint defined on two task types $task_x, task_y \in T_T$ is derived if for each process instance $p_i \in P_I$ and for all corresponding task instances $t_x, t_y \in T_I : t_x \in ti(task_x, p_i) \wedge t_y \in ti(task_y, p_i) \wedge es(t_x) \neq es(t_y)$ applies. Algorithm 2 traverses all process instances and checks if the executing-subjects of two task types differ in each process instance and then defines a candidate DME constraint on the given task types.

Algorithm 2 Derive candidate DME constraints

Input: T_T, P_I
1: **for each** $task_x \in T_T$ **do**
2: **for each** $task_y \in T_T \mid task_y \neq task_x$ **do**
3: **for each** $p_i \in P_I \mid \forall t_x, t_y \in T_I :$
4: $t_x \in ti(task_x, p_i) \wedge t_y \in ti(task_y, p_i) \wedge$
5: $es(t_x) \neq es(t_y)$ **do**
6: **set** $task_x \in dme(task_y)$ ▷ marked as candidate
7: **end for**
8: **end for**
9: **end for**

Again, Figure 7 depicts a process execution history excerpt with two process instances. In Figure 7, the two task instances “Negotiate contract” and “Approve contract” were both performed by the same subjects “Alice” and “Bob” (shown via arrow 1). However, in each process instance both tasks were performed by a different subject (shown via arrow 2). Therefore, we derive a candidate DME constraint for the tasks from Figure 7.




Figure 7. Example detection of DME tasks

²The detection of constraints from XES is conducted in the same way.

D. Deriving Candidate Subject-Binding (SB) Constraints

A SB constraint defines that two (or more) subject-bound tasks must be performed by the same subject (see also Definition 1.9 and [5]). We derive a candidate SB constraint from a process execution history, if for each process instance the subject executing one task instance is the same subject who executes a consecutive task instance. This means, two tasks $task_x, task_y \in T_T$ are candidate SB tasks if for each process instance $p_i \in P_I$ and for all corresponding task instances $t_x, t_y \in T_I : t_x \in ti(task_x, p_i) \wedge t_y \in ti(task_y, p_i) \wedge es(t_x) = es(t_y)$ applies. Thus, Algorithm 3 traverses all process instances and checks if the executing-subjects of two task types are equal and then defines a candidate SB constraint on the given task types.

Algorithm 3 Derive candidate SB constraints

Input: T_T, P_I

- 1: **for each** $task_x \in T_T$ **do**
- 2: **for each** $task_y \in T_T \mid task_y \neq task_x$ **do**
- 3: **for each** $p_i \in P_I \forall t_x, t_y \in T_I :$
- 4: $t_x \in ti(task_x, p_i) \wedge t_y \in ti(task_y, p_i) \wedge$
- 5: $es(t_x) = es(t_y)$ **do**
- 6: **set** $task_x \in sb(task_y)$ ▷ marked as candidate
- 7: **end for**
- 8: **end for**
- 9: **end for**

Figure 8 depicts a process execution history excerpt with two process instances that include the tasks “Check credit worthiness” and “Negotiate contract”. This example shows that both tasks are always performed by the same subject within the same process instance (shown via arrows). Therefore, we derive a candidate SB constraint from this process execution history.




Figure 8. Example detection of SB tasks

Furthermore, we can analyze the assignment relations to exclude false positive SB constraints. For example, a role may exist that is owned by a single subject only. In this case, two (or more) tasks assigned to such a role are

not necessarily subject-bound. This is because, only one subject is allowed to perform these tasks via her/his role ownership. Thus, such a role-to-subject assignment relation indicates that the candidate subject-bound tasks of this role can potentially be removed in a refined RBAC model.

E. Deriving Candidate Role-Binding (RB) Constraints

A RB constraint defines that two (or more) role-bound tasks must always be performed by members of the same role (see also Definition 1.10 and [5]). However, role-bound tasks are not necessarily executed by the same subject. To derive candidate RB constraints, the process execution history must contain role information, i.e. information on which role a subject has activated to execute the task. In particular, we derive a candidate RB constraint if for each process instance the executing-role of a task instance is equivalent to the executing-role of a subsequent task instance. This means, two tasks $task_x, task_y \in T_T$ are candidate RB tasks if in each process instance $p_i \in P_I$ and for all corresponding task instances $t_x, t_y \in T_I : t_x \in ti(task_x, p_i) \wedge t_y \in ti(task_y, p_i) \wedge er(t_x) = er(t_y)$ applies. Algorithm 4 traverses all process instances and checks if the executing-role of two task types are equal and then defines a candidate RB constraint on the given task types.

Algorithm 4 Derive candidate RB constraints

Input: T_T, P_I

- 1: **for each** $task_x \in T_T$ **do**
- 2: **for each** $task_y \in T_T \mid task_y \neq task_x$ **do**
- 3: **for each** $p_i \in P_I \forall t_x, t_y \in T_I :$
- 4: $t_x \in ti(task_x, p_i) \wedge t_y \in ti(task_y, p_i) \wedge$
- 5: $er(t_x) = er(t_y)$ **do**
- 6: **set** $task_x \in rb(task_y)$ ▷ marked as candidate
- 7: **end for**
- 8: **end for**
- 9: **end for**

Typically, MXML and XES files do not contain the executing-role of a task instance. Therefore, we cannot derive candidate role-bound tasks directly. However, we can derive role information from the “Organizational” extension provided in the XES standard for process execution histories (see also Section III-A). Thus, we can only derive candidate RB constraints if this organizational extension is used in a process execution history.

For instance, Figure 9 shows an excerpt of an XES file with two process instances (`trace`) that contain two process history entries (`event`), respectively. Each entry is composed of two elements (`string`). One with the key `concept:name` representing the task instance and the other with the key `org:role` representing the executing-role. In Figure 9, the same role performed the tasks “Check credit worthiness” and “Reject application” in each process instance (shown via arrows). In the first process instance both tasks are executed by subjects owning the role “Clerk”. In the second process




Figure 9. Example detection of RB tasks

instance, these tasks are executed by subjects owning the role “Manager”. Thus, for each process instance subjects owning the same role execute the two tasks. Therefore, we derive a candidate RB constraint from the process execution history.

IV. RELATED WORK

Our work complements work from the area of process mining, especially organizational mining. Organizational mining aims to discover information about the relationship between subjects and executed tasks in a PAIS (see, e.g., [12], [13]). Song and van der Aalst [13] introduce an approach to mine organizational models and social structures from process execution histories. For example, they use mining techniques to cluster subjects into groups based on their execution of similar tasks. Jin et al. [14] introduce an algorithm to produce organizational models from process execution histories. Similar to [13], Jin et al. use a similarity measure to cluster subjects of a process execution history into roles if they (partially) completed the same tasks in a similar frequency. Moreover, Rembert and Ellis [23] provide a formal definition to mine different aspects from process execution histories. One aspect the authors present is the role assignment perspective which captures the relationship between roles and tasks. They introduce an algorithm to calculate this relationship by clustering subjects using a similarity metric.

In the context of process mining, “staff assignment mining” aims at discovering assignment rules from log files and corresponding organizational information (see, e.g., [24], [25]). As a result the resulting staff assignment rules identify the set of subjects who are allowed to perform certain tasks based on the combination of subject properties (e.g. the role or the abilities of a subject).

Moreover, our approach is related to role mining. In role

mining, data mining techniques are used to detect patterns in a set of access permissions [26]. These patterns are used to derive candidate RBAC policy sets. Furthermore, several approaches exist that include preexisting business information (e.g. job or department descriptions) to create RBAC policy sets via role mining (see [27]–[31]).

In [16], we presented a preliminary approach to derive candidate RBAC artifacts and assignment relations from a process execution history. This paper extends the approach of [16] and provides algorithms to derive entailment constraints, such as mutual exclusion and binding constraints, from a process execution history. Thereby, our work complements the approaches mentioned above by considering process-related information to automatically derive candidate RBAC models that include task-based entailment constraints.

V. CONCLUSION

PAIS record process execution histories that contain information about the subjects performing the tasks included in a business process. In this paper, we presented a systematic approach for the automated derivation of candidate RBAC models from process execution histories. Such RBAC models specify roles, subjects, tasks/permissions, assignment relations, as well as mutual exclusion and binding constraints defined on tasks. Therefore, RBAC models derived from process execution histories can serve as a basis for understanding how an organization actually enforces access control policies in PAIS.

In our future work, we will examine how other types of candidate constraints (such as context constraints [32]) can be derived from process execution histories.

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